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Abstract 
 
Four population scenarios were derived that describe indicators of demographic behaviour for people living in 
different future political-economic contexts. This policy paper explores future trends in i) population growth at 
regional and national levels, ii) working age populations, in view of demographic dividend potential, and iii) 
elderly populations, in view of the financial burden they place on economies. Results show that different 
scenarios do not have large effects on population growth, at least up to 2030. This is due to the in-built 
‘population momentum’ effect in the relatively young age-structures of most southern and eastern 
Mediterranean countries (SEMCs). In the short term, up to 2030, and depending on which economic-political 
scenario unfolds, SEMCs are expected to grow from 280 million people to a figure of between 362 and 349 
million people. Thus, in a period of about 20 years SEMCs are expected to grow by between 69 and 83 million 
people. In the same period, EU27 populations will grow by 21 million; only from about 500 to 521 million 
people. Between 2030 and 2050, additional population growth is foreseen in SEMCs, between 48 and 62 
million people, while EU27 populations are expected to grow by 4 million only. SEMCs vary widely regarding 
demographic transition profiles so that demographic dividend potentials also vary. Old-age dependency ratios – 
the share of elderly people in relation to the working age population – are still low compared to EU27 ratios, 
but will increase after 2035. Should SEMCs’ economies remain politically, economically and environmentally 
precarious in the coming decades, their relatively low dependency ratios may impose an even higher social and 
financial burden on economies than the EU countries’ high dependency ratios impose on their economies. 
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Introduction 
The European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) was 
developed in 2004, with the goal of strengthening 
the prosperity, stability and security of all and 
avoiding the emergence of new dividing lines 
between EU countries and its neighbours. The ENP 
idea was revamped in 2008 with the launch of the 
Union for the Mediterranean (UfM); a multi-lateral 
partnership between the 27 EU countries and 16 
Mediterranean partner countries from North Africa, 
the Middle East and the Balkans. The UfM (also 
known as the Barcelona Process) was launched 
when plans to create an autonomous Mediterranean 
Union, akin to the EU, were dropped (EC, 2012). 
Demographic factors and pressures in both EU and 
ENP countries impinge on the realisation of the 
ENP and UfM goals. The latter include Algeria, 
Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Egypt, Georgia, 
Israel, Jordan, Lebanon, Libya, Moldova, Morocco, 
Occupied Palestinian Territory, Syria, Tunisia and 
Ukraine. The ENP excludes Turkey because, 
contrary to ENP countries, it gained an EU 
accession perspective in 1999 at the Helsinki 
European Council meeting (EC, 2012).  
Population structures, pressures and future prospects 
in the two regions are quite different because the 
characteristics of demographic transition, such as 
the timing and speed of decline in fertility and 
mortality rates are quite different. Compared to EU 
countries, most ENP countries started experiencing 
declining fertility and mortality much later, during 
the 1990s, especially the southern Mediterranean 
ENP countries (WHO, 2011; UN, 2011a; UN, 2012). 
As a result, ageing population structures currently 
characterise EU countries, while younger age 
structures characterise many ENP countries.  
Systematic and comparative research has been 
carried out on future population and development 
prospects of EU countries (e.g. Rees et al., 2012; 
Hilderink, 2004; Lutz & Scherbov, 2004), but it is 
absent for EU neighbour countries. Demographic 
research carried out by the MEDPRO project 
(Groenewold et al., 2012) aimed to contribute to this 
effort by presenting population scenarios for ENP 
countries for the period 2010-2050, analysing the 
implications. Below, we briefly describe how 
development scenarios were derived by the project, 
how population scenarios were derived from these 
and what the scenarios entail. Next, we present main 
population scenario results. Our focus is on 
population growth prospects at the level of regions 
and countries, on working age populations (15-
64yrs) and on the elderly (65yrs+). In the 
concluding section we discuss the plausibility of the 
scenario results in light of the political upheaval and  
 
transformations since 2010 (i.e. the Arab Spring) 
and we address the policy implications of these 
events.  
The focus on working age populations and the 
elderly is important because any change in these two 
age groups has implications for the economy. The 
share of the working age population determines the 
size of the potential labour force contributing to 
economic production and growth. A rise in the share 
of the working age population is therefore 
considered as a ‘demographic dividend’ to the 
economy, provided certain conditions are met. The 
share of the elderly is also of economic interest 
because, generally speaking, they may contribute to 
the economy indirectly through investments derived 
from their accumulated wealth and savings. They 
are also consumers of paid or subsidised old-age 
care (Mason & Lee, 2007; Lee & Mason, 2006; 
Mason, 2005).  
We focus on a subset of ENP countries, the ten 
geographically and culturally adjacent ENP 
countries: Algeria, Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Lebanon, 
Libya, Morocco, Palestine (O.P.T.), Syria, Tunisia, 
and Turkey. Turkey was included because it is a key 
player in the political arenas of the Mediterranean 
region and the Middle East, in a cultural and an 
economic sense it is intertwined with neighbouring 
ENP countries and comprises one of the largest 
populations in the region. Below, we refer to these 
11 countries as SEMCs (southern and eastern 
Mediterranean countries). 
Population scenarios 
A first step in the design of population scenarios 
was to identify the pillars of a framework for 
development scenarios, which are later used to 
derive population scenarios. The MEDPRO project 
chose the following pillars to build a framework for 
development scenarios: i) development of total 
wealth in SEMCs, ii) development of political-
economic cooperation between SEMCs and EU 
countries, and iii) development trajectories are 
assumed to be either a success or a failure (Sessa, 
2011; Ayadi & Sessa, 2011). The table below brings 
these pillars together, shaping the contours of a 
broad framework for development scenarios. 
Different combinations lead to eight different 
development scenarios, which should be interpreted 
as eight different visions of how the economic-
political context of SEMC countries might look. 
However, working with eight different 
conceptualisations of the future is rather confusing 
and cumbersome; assumptions were therefore 
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introduced to reduce the number of eligible 
scenarios from eight to four (S1 to S4 in Annex 1):  
a. Future increases in total wealth cannot coexist 
or be achieved without interregional or regional 
cooperation.  
b. Future options of international cooperation are 
limited to two types: i) cooperation with EU 
countries and the integration of SEMCs into an 
expanding EU market, ii) the launch of an 
independent Pan-Arab political and economic 
system akin to the EU.  
c. SEMCs either cooperate within a framework 
with EU countries, or in one with all other Arab 
League nations, not in both.  
Table 1. Broad framework for population and 
development scenarios  
 
The framework in Table 1 was then transformed 
into a two-dimensional framework (Figure 1) 
whereby each development scenario comprises a 
particular combination of characteristics in terms of 
developments in regional political cooperation and 
envisioned total wealth prospects. Development 
scenarios sketch broad and different kinds of future 
worlds in which demographic behaviour in terms of 
migration, fertility and mortality is likely to differ, 
leading to different population growth trajectories. 
For practical reasons, the four scenarios were 
labelled, providing a kind of ‘identity’ to each 
scenario. Contrary to the business-as-usual and 
stress scenarios, the integration and alliance 
scenarios are both, economically and politically 
speaking, favourable outlooks for the future.  
Below, storylines are presented that describe the 
qualitative economic, political, and demographic 
characteristics and assumptions of four population 
and development scenarios, and we conclude with 
an overview table (Annex 1) showing the results of 
operationalising these storylines and assumptions. 
These were used to derive the population scenarios 
results proper for the period 2010-2050.  
 
Figure 1. Derived framework for population and development scenarios (adapted from Sessa, 2011) 
 
The business-as-usual (BAU) scenario (S1) 
sketches an unfavourable political and economic 
future that could be interpreted as an extrapolation 
of past trends. It assumes that the political 
upheavals and changes in various SEMCs (e.g. 
Tunisia, Libya, Egypt, and Syria) since 2010, as 
well as the EU financial crisis, will settle at a 
development trajectory between 2015 and 2020. 
This could be interpreted as a repositioning on a 
trend line that would have emerged in the absence 
Increase Decrease
Success S2
Failure S1
Success S3
Failure S4
Total wealth
EU‐SMC cooperation
Meditteranean Alliance cooperation
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of these upheavals and changes. This means a 
continued decrease in total wealth in populations 
resulting from a partial and ad hoc kind of SEMC-
EU cooperation that fails to develop firm action 
and collaboration regarding key political, security, 
economic, socio-cultural and environmental issues. 
The BAU scenario (S1) assumes that the EU also 
pays a price for not expanding EU membership 
beyond the current 27 countries, i.e. in terms of 
foregoing certain economic and political benefits. 
Overall, the BAU scenario (S1) assumes that 
during the 2010-2050 period the economic 
influence of the EU in the Middle East continues to 
decline. On the political front, the scenario assumes 
that the Israel-Palestine conflict will not be 
resolved, thereby constraining economic growth 
and political stability in the region. From a long-
term perspective, this scenario assumes no 
breakthrough political, social, technological, and 
cultural changes (Ayadi & Sessa, 2011).  
Also in terms of demographic behaviour, no major 
changes are assumed to take place. Regarding 
international migration stocks and flows, the BAU 
scenario assumes that annual net numbers of 
migrants (i.e. number of immigrants minus 
emigrants) for the period 2005-2010 remains more 
or less stable during the whole of the period 2010-
2050, with the exception of the period 2010-2015. 
The latter accounts for the unexpected international 
migration flows resulting from the political 
upheaval during the 2010-2012 period (Arab 
Spring). We expect that numbers emigrating in a 
number of countries will be higher than anticipated 
in those years. The net numbers of migrants that we 
used in our population scenario projections are 
based on figures compiled by the UN Population 
Division (UN, 2011a). Regarding future fertility 
levels, the BAU scenario assumes that the observed 
past changes in fertility rates in most SEMCs will 
continue, but the speed of the change will differ by 
country, depending on past rates of change. Thus, 
fertility rates for some countries will decline even 
further, while rates of other countries may increase. 
The decline will be less rapid than, for instance, in 
the integration scenario (S2), because it will take 
more time before institutions (men, kinship groups, 
community) will have lowered family size 
preferences and individual women gain more 
freedom to decide the number of children to have. 
However, it is expected that by 2050 the average 
country-specific fertility rates will have settled at 
replacement level in the SEMCs’ region. This 
means that, on average, women in SEMCs are 
expected to give birth to 2.1 children during their 
reproductive life so that, after accounting for 
mortality risks, each mother will just be replaced by 
a daughter who also will become a mother and 
survive at least up to the end of her reproductive 
life, at about age 50. This scenario assumes that 
observed past improvements in life expectancy at 
birth for each individual country will continue but 
at a pace that is dependent on the level currently 
attained and the pace with which life expectancy 
improved since 1990. The BAU scenario assumes 
that differences between countries regarding 
fertility, mortality and migration rates remain intact.  
Integration scenario (S2) describes a very 
favourable political and economic future. EU-
SEMC cooperation is assumed to improve 
significantly so that by 2050 the EU27 market has 
expanded to include the 11 SEMCs, becoming 
EU38. This market is highly integrated at the 
political, economic, social and military levels, 
where total wealth has increased markedly, and 
where incidence and prevalence of poverty in 
SEMCs is comparable to the average EU level. 
Because of institutional and governance adaptations 
in SEMC economies it will take up to 2030 before 
these countries match the economic growth rates of 
EU countries. In this vision of the future, the 
Palestinian-Israeli conflict is resolved by 2020, 
providing extra impetus to economic growth and 
cultural tolerance. By 2050, the EU38 has become 
one of the three key economic and political powers 
in the world, alongside the USA and China (Ayadi 
& Sessa, 2011).  
Such a development context is likely to be 
associated with different types of demographic 
behaviour than in other scenarios. In the first phase 
of economic growth (2010-2030) it is expected that 
the mobility behaviour of people will increase, 
contributing to migration from SEMCs to EU 
countries where labour demand is increasing due to 
rapidly ageing working age populations. 
Furthermore, many of the SEMC emigrants who 
work as contract labourers in the oil-producing 
Gulf States are also expected to migrate to EU 
countries because access to and stay in EU 
countries have become much easier and living 
conditions better. As a result, negative net numbers 
of migrants are expected to increase during the 
period 2010-2030 as emigrants from SEMCs to the 
EU will outnumber immigrants and return migrants. 
In the second phase of economic growth (2030-
2050), economies and welfare in SEMCs will have 
reached full development. Potential emigrants now 
find it easier to secure attractive income-earning 
opportunities in their own country while return 
migration will become more significant, including 
children of first-generation emigrants who were 
born in EU countries of destination. As costs of 
international travel relative to total income decrease 
in this scenario, temporary short-term and circular 
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types of migration will be on the increase too. The 
overall net result is that during the 2030-2050 
period, all SEMCs currently having negative net 
migration numbers (i.e. emigration higher than 
immigration) will experience their negative net 
migration numbers turning into positive ones.  
In an EU38 (i.e. EU27 + 11SEMCs) setting it is 
expected that intercultural contact with EU citizens 
increases and that EU rules and regulations 
regarding equality and equal opportunities of men 
and women are adopted in SEMCs. Overall, the 
status and decision-making power of women is 
expected to increase considerably in this scenario, 
which is attributed to fertility rates declining more 
rapidly than in the BAU scenario (S1), leading to 
rates resembling the currently observed low levels 
in EU27 countries, which is currently 1.5 children. 
It is expected that, as time goes by, similar 
economic, social, cultural and psychosocial factors 
underlying the decline in European fertility will 
affect fertility levels in SEMCs. For instance, larger 
numbers of women in the SEMCs will successfully 
participate in the education system, leading to 
higher levels of educational attainment, to gains in 
decision-making power regarding personal 
aspirations (e.g. number of children, timing and 
spacing of births, labour force participation and 
employment careers), household and community 
matters (participation in councils and local 
government). Furthermore, it is expected that 
‘individualism’ will become more widespread in 
SEMCs so that an increasing number of women 
have the number of children they want. Also, 
women in SEMCs will be increasingly called upon 
to participate in the labour market to cope with 
local labour shortages resulting from economic 
development and growth. It is therefore expected 
that women in SEMCs, notably those with the right 
diplomas, will have opportunities to work in 
Europe and will increasingly make use of that 
opportunity. Overall, the educational attainment 
increases of women are expected to lead to an 
irreversible increase of female labour force 
participation (i.e. paid work outside the home, 
including working overseas) competing with 
childbearing and rearing, resulting in lower fertility 
aspirations and rates. Another fertility-reducing 
effect in this high economic growth scenario comes 
from expected improvements in health 
infrastructure in SEMCs. Such improvements are 
expected to lead to a further reduction in levels of 
unmet need for family planning services.  
This economic growth scenario will also have a net 
positive effect on the health and mortality 
conditions of people in SEMCs as the availability, 
access and affordability of health services will 
eventually be on a par with the average EU level. 
Pre- and post-natal care, immunisation of children, 
childcare practices of mothers (partly due to 
increases in educational attainment levels) will 
improve, leading to much lower infant and child 
mortality rates and higher life expectancies. 
However, this scenario also entails a negative 
development as the unhealthy western-style diet 
and lifestyle will be increasingly adopted in the 
region, leading to further increases in obesity 
(among adults and children) and related welfare 
diseases with higher risks of mortality at 
intermediate and higher ages. The expected net 
effect is that the pace with which life expectancy in 
the SEMCs increases in this scenario will be higher 
than in the BAU- (S1) and stress (S4) scenarios, but 
lower than in the alliance scenario (S3).  
Compared to the BAU and stress scenarios (S1 and 
S4), the integration scenario (S2) is a kind of 
‘convergence scenario’ in that it assumes that 
differences between countries regarding fertility, 
mortality and migration rates will eventually have 
disappeared by 2050.  
Alliance scenario (S3) also sketches a favourable 
economic and political future context. SEMCs will 
increase their collaboration and expand to include 
other countries in the Middle East (e.g. Iraq, 
Yemen, Saudi Arabia, and Sudan) and form one 
large pan-Arab common market, akin to the EU. 
Turkey is assumed to join the EU. Due to their 
geographic proximity a strategic alliance is formed 
between the EU and pan-Arab markets to ensure 
that the two adjacent and independent markets are 
connected in an efficient and effective manner, 
contributing to economic prosperity and political 
stability in both regions. Thus, economic and 
political interaction and development is first and 
foremost taking place between countries within the 
two regional markets. According to this scenario, 
the Israeli-Palestinian conflict is also assumed to be 
resolved. However, peace results from a somewhat 
different political process than in scenario S2 as in 
this scenario the weight of Arab states’ political 
influence in reaching a peace agreement will be 
higher than in scenario S2. The main point is that a 
peace solution has been reached, removing barriers 
to internal (south-south) market cooperation and 
intercultural contact. Eventually, the Mediterranean 
region emerges as a peaceful and inspiring meeting 
and business place of people living in two adjacent 
regional markets. The EU and pan-Arab markets 
collaborate, in particular on some key issues such 
as security, the quality of environmental resources 
and research and development. However, the 
development of an independent and effective pan-
Arab economy and political system takes time so 
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that economic benefits in terms of total wealth 
increases are expected at a later stage in the period 
2010-2050 than according to the integration 
scenario (S2). This scenario envisages a multi-polar 
global market with several economic regions 
competing and with no particular region 
dominating (Ayadi & Sessa, 2011).  
As economies grow and the movement of people 
and goods within the two newly established market 
areas becomes easier, it is expected that the net 
negative migration of many SEMCs increases as 
working in the Gulf States becomes easier. These 
volumes are expected to level off during the period 
2015-2030 as growing SEMC economies 
increasingly provide job-opportunities to their own 
citizens. Like the integration scenario (S2), the 
economic growth process in SEMCs takes time to 
gain momentum and success so that this scenario 
foresees that negative net migration numbers, as a 
result of declining numbers of emigrants and 
increasing numbers of immigrants, will gradually 
turn into positive net numbers of migration by 2030 
and later. By 2050 this process will lead to a 
situation whereby numbers emigrating and 
immigrating will balance so that the net numbers of 
migrants is zero. Thus, the orientation of migrants 
in this scenario is primarily towards labour markets 
in the Arab region and not towards the EU or 
elsewhere, as in the integration scenario (S2). In 
this scenario it is also expected that most long-term 
refugees will have managed to establish a new life 
in their host country and have integrated into these 
societies.  
There are two main forces at play that determine 
future trends in fertility according to this scenario. 
On the one hand economic growth is expected to 
lead to major improvements in availability and 
access to health services. This will have a fertility- 
reducing effect as, like the situation in the 
integration scenario (S2), levels of unmet need for 
family planning; around 10% in many SEMCs (UN, 
2012), are expected to reduce to 0%. On the other 
hand, western-style individualism will have much 
less of an effect on the lives of people in SEMCs 
than in the integration scenario (S2). Traditional 
family norms and values will remain intact and the 
influence of the larger social group and 
concomitant control mechanisms will lead to 
family size preferences that are, on average, 
somewhat higher than in the integration scenario 
(S2). However, such traditions are under pressure 
as the labour market in this scenario will 
increasingly expect women to participate and this 
will stimulate governments to encourage parents to 
invest in the education of their daughters, 
eventually leading to higher levels of educational 
attainment and occupational skills among women 
(and men). As a result the current very low labour 
force participation rates of women are expected to 
increase significantly. We assume that the net 
outcome of both forces is that fertility levels 
decline, but that the speed of decline is slower than 
assumed in the integration scenario (S2), so that, by 
2050, fertility levels in this scenario will have 
settled at a somewhat higher level than in the 
integration scenario (S2).  
Health status and life expectancy improvements are 
expected to be better than in the integration 
scenario (S2) implying a higher annual rate of 
change in life expectancy than in the integration 
scenario (S2). The main reason for this assumption 
is that western-type lifestyles and health behaviour 
will have less of a chance of being adopted due to 
the presence of a strong tradition of social control 
over how individuals behave. Thus, individualism 
will have far less chance of developing, so that 
adverse western-style lifestyles will occur less than 
in the integration scenario (S2). Overall, and in 
contrast to the situation in the integration scenario 
(S2), individuals will remain more embedded in 
their social group and receive more protection in 
situations of stress, ill-health and need.  
Like the integration scenario (S2), and contrary to 
the BAU and stress scenarios (S1 and S4) country-
specific values of indicators of fertility and 
mortality in this alliance scenario (S3) are assumed 
to converge to some average regional level value.  
Stress scenario (S4) is a worst-case scenario 
regarding economic and political development in 
the Arab world. The Mediterranean Sea is 
perceived as the dividing line between two 
opposing and competing cultures, i.e. the European 
vis-à-vis the Arab cultures. Within the Arab region, 
the Israeli-Palestinian conflict lingers on, 
hampering economic development and political 
cooperation within the region. Although inhabitants 
of SEMCs pay the highest price in terms of 
decreasing prosperity, security and well-being, 
people in adjacent EU countries will also be 
affected by negative economic and political spill-
over effects in the medium and long run. Factories, 
firms and small shops in SEMCs find it 
increasingly difficult to make a profit and pay their 
staff. The mismatch between government 
expenditures and income becomes greater so that, 
eventually, governments have to lay off staff. As 
government institutions employ a relatively large 
share of the labour force, unemployment rates 
increase dramatically, notably among young adults, 
leading to political unrest and foreign investors 
becoming more hesitant to invest in SEMCs. 
Eventually, political stability in the region is at 
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stake and new conflicts arise that cannot adequately 
be dealt with by the governments and elite groups. 
This scenario essentially describes a future with 
increased poverty, political instability and 
insecurity, natural resource depletion and pollution, 
and social and ethnic conflicts (Ayadi & Sessa, 
2011). 
In such a future context, households find it 
increasingly difficult to cope with poverty. In spite 
of the restricted access to EU countries and Gulf 
States, many unemployed citizens, mainly men, 
choose to leave the country in search of income 
overseas to support their families and relatives back 
home. Many emigrants will therefore enter the EU 
and Gulf State countries as illegal immigrants 
where they become exploited and live as outcasts. 
Some of them will be recovered by jihad and other 
terrorist organisations that prosper and gain power 
over time, increasing the probability of war in the 
region and beyond. As this will not go unnoticed by 
the media in the EU, the general attitude towards 
immigrants in the EU will become even more 
negative than it is today. In spite of the limited 
prospects many emigrants have abroad, poverty at 
home means that many people are forced to migrate 
to other countries. During the period 2010-2050 the 
stress scenario (S4) foresees that annual net 
migration numbers will hover at very high negative 
numbers as emigrants far outnumber immigrants 
and return migrants. Only a sub-group of well-
educated SEMC citizens find ways to overcome 
restrictive entry measures (e.g. for the EU, Gulf 
States, the US, and Far East) and, through internet 
contact, find attractive jobs abroad (the brain drain). 
These persons find employment because the ageing 
EU labour market provides openings to well-
educated and skilled immigrants from outside the 
EU. In the stress scenario (S4) the situation in 
SEMCs has become such that emigrants do not 
want to return and do their utmost to reunite with 
their family by letting them immigrate too in 
destination countries. The (negative) net number of 
international migrants rises to historical highs in 
SEMCs during the period 2010-2050. 
The deterioration of SEMC economies results in 
more impoverished health services, including the 
availability and access to family planning services. 
Having many children becomes a great burden in 
terms of cost, leading to fewer births in some 
families than desired. However, in other families 
fertility levels increase because access to family 
planning services decreases as costs (user fees) 
increase. In terms of underlying factors, negative 
economic growth is, generally speaking, 
detrimental to female labour force participation and 
wages, resulting in more women staying at home, 
losing decision-making power and independence 
and leading to a higher number of children than 
anticipated. In a similar way, parents tend to invest 
less in educating their daughters if poverty strikes 
the household, also leading to higher fertility rates. 
Overall, the stress scenario (S4) foresees that the 
long-term net effect of poor macro-economic and 
political performance is that fertility decline in 
some SEMCs will halt or even increase during the 
2010-2050 period and that, at the aggregate level of 
the SEMC region, the fertility level settles at levels 
above replacement level fertility. Of all scenarios, 
the decline in country-specific fertility levels is the 
least and eventually settles at higher levels in 2050 
than under the other scenarios.  
The detrimental macro-economic and political 
trend implies that health infrastructure becomes 
increasingly disrupted. Furthermore, large-scale 
emigration means that in certain places social group 
support systems break down and communities 
disintegrate, leading to increased poverty levels in 
urban and rural areas. Deteriorating living 
conditions may result in higher infection rates and 
disease prevalence among vulnerable groups, such 
as pregnant women and children. At the macro 
level this development may translate into higher 
maternal mortality rates and higher childhood 
mortality rates, leading to life expectancies that 
increase less or even decrease. We assume that, in 
times of stress, the tendency of people in this 
region is that community spirit increases leading to 
a revival of social support systems within descent 
groups, clans, neighbourhoods, etc., and this will 
have a positive effect on mortality rates in 
vulnerable groups. The stress scenario (S4) foresees 
that the net effect of these expectations is that life 
expectancy, at the level of the nation, will still 
increase, but at a much slower pace than in the 
other three scenarios.  
The above storylines and assumptions were 
operationalised and are summarised in Annex 1.  
Data 
Base-line age-sex data of SEMCs and data required 
for the formulation of assumptions about future 
rates of fertility, mortality and migration (Annex 1) 
were obtained from databases of National 
Statistical Offices of SEMCs, UN Population 
Division (UN, 2011a), World Health Organisation 
(Health statistics and health information systems) 
(WHO, 2011), and from the UN Global Migration 
Database (version 0.3.6) (UN, 2011b). For an 
explanation of the projection methodology, see 
Groenewold et al. (2012). 
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Regional and national population scenarios 
Table 3 and Figure 2 show that populations in 
SEMCs are expected to grow from 280 million in 
2010 to a figure of between about 395 million (S4) 
and 426 million (S3) in 2050. In the short term 
(2010-2030) SEMC populations are expected to 
grow, to a figure of between 69 (S4) and 83 (S3) 
million. Conversely, during that period EU27 
populations are expected to grow by about 21 
million (Eurostat, 2012). In the long term (2030-
2050) however, another 48 to 62 million persons 
will be added to SEMC populations while only 4 
million will be added to EU27 populations. In the 
next ten years the population in the SEMC region is 
expected to grow by a figure of between 39 million 
and 43 million, depending on the scenario.  
Table 5 shows that SEMCs differ markedly in 
population size and population growth rates and 
that regional population growth is predominantly 
determined by growth in the largest two countries, 
Egypt and Turkey. There, in 2010, about 81 and 73 
million people lived, respectively, comprising 55% 
of the population in the region. At the level of the 
region, the effect of the alliance scenario (S3) 
assumptions lead to the highest population growth, 
while at country level, different scenarios lead to 
highest population growth. For instance, in the case 
of Lebanon it is the integration scenario that (S2) 
leads to the highest population growth while for 
Libya and the Occupied Palestinian Territory it is 
the BAU scenario (S1).  
Expected population growth in Egypt is the highest 
in the region. Depending on the scenario, Egypt’s 
population will increase between 2010 and 2050 to 
come to a figure of between 44 and 53 million 
persons. The stress scenario (S4) has the most 
severe effects on population growth in Lebanon. 
Lebanon already has a low and below replacement 
fertility level (TFR about 1.8 in 2005). Although 
fertility in Lebanon is expected to increase to 
replacement level fertility during the period 2010-
2050, the effect of large-scale emigration in the 
stress scenario (S4) will more than cancel out the 
increase in births, leading to an expected decline in 
the population from 4.2 million in 2010 to about 
2.8 million during the 2045-2050 period. Israel is 
the only other country for which population size 
will also decline in the stress scenario (S4), as a 
result of the assumed high level of out-migration 
and a very low level of immigration.  
Table 3. Population estimates by development scenario (S1-S4), and UN estimates (millions) 
 
Source: Groenewold et al., 2012. 
2010
S1 S2 S3 S4 UN S1 S2 S3 S4 UN S1 S2 S3 S4 UN
Algeria 35,5 41,0 40,6 41,0 40,6 40,6 45,3 44,3 45,4 43,8 44,0 51,6 50,3 52,3 48,1 48,2
Egypt 81,1 95,9 94,9 95,8 95,2 95,7 109,3 106,6 109,3 107,3 108,0 133,5 125,7 132,2 130,7 126,9
Israel 7,4 8,5 8,6 8,5 8,0 8,9 9,6 10,3 9,9 7,9 10,2 11,7 13,4 11,8 7,2 12,7
Jordan 6,2 7,7 7,5 7,6 7,3 7,4 9,2 8,8 9,1 8,0 8,5 12,0 11,9 11,7 9,0 10,1
Lebanon 4,2 4,6 4,8 4,8 4,4 4,6 4,9 5,6 5,4 4,0 4,8 5,0 7,1 6,1 2,8 4,9
Libya 6,4 7,2 7,1 7,2 6,9 7,1 8,0 7,3 7,8 7,0 7,9 9,7 8,6 8,9 6,9 9,1
Morocco 31,9 35,6 35,0 35,7 35,4 35,5 38,7 37,1 39,0 37,9 38,0 42,7 41,5 44,3 40,5 40,6
O.P.T. 4,0 5,5 5,4 5,5 5,2 5,3 7,2 6,8 7,0 6,2 6,8 10,8 9,9 9,8 8,5 9,8
Syria 20,4 24,8 24,5 24,7 24,4 24,3 29,7 28,4 29,2 28,2 28,2 38,4 35,1 36,4 35,1 34,0
Tunisia 10,5 11,5 11,5 11,5 11,3 11,7 12,3 12,0 12,4 11,7 12,4 13,2 13,0 13,4 11,6 13,2
Turkey 72,8 80,9 80,6 81,1 80,7 81,8 87,7 86,6 88,3 87,0 88,1 96,1 92,5 98,4 95,3 95,6
Total 280,4 323,3 320,6 323,5 319,5 322,8 362,0 353,9 362,8 348,9 356,9 424,5 409,0 425,2 395,8 405,2
2020 2030 2050
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The figures in Annex 3 show for each country and 
for each scenario how the share of the working age 
population in the total population is expected to 
change between 2010 and 2050. Differences 
between countries appear to be large, reflecting 
differences in when fertility and mortality started 
declining and the speed with which this took place.  
In all countries the integration scenario (S2) is 
associated with highest levels and increases in 
demographic dividend, while the S3 scenario is 
frequently second best. This is not a priori evident. 
It turns out that these two scenarios in combination 
with existing age-sex distributions of SEMC 
populations lead to the most favourable timing and 
duration of fertility declines and life expectancy 
increases during the period 2010-2050 (e.g. see 
Annex 1). The rapid rise of the demographic 
dividend occurs because numbers populating the 
bottom of the age-pyramid decrease rapidly, due to 
the speed of decline in fertility. This decline is not 
attenuated much by growing population numbers in 
the highest age groups (65+) resulting from life 
expectancy increases at higher ages and from larger 
birth cohorts that gradually start populating these 
highest age groups.  
The figures in Annex 3 show that, as time goes by, 
the demographic dividend, after a period of 
increase, declines again and this is because 
population decline in the lowest age groups will 
increasingly be compensated by population growth 
in the oldest age-groups (65+), which is caused by 
the long-term effect of rising life expectancies 
(Annex 1) and of large birth cohorts of the past that 
start populating the oldest age groups (65+). Thus, 
during the period of the increase in demographic 
dividend the share of the dependent population 
comprises predominantly youth below age 15 and 
less so of elderly (>65+), while during the period of 
declining demographic dividend the population 
composition of the dependents shifts towards an 
increased share of elderly people.  
The figure also shows that for the majority of 
countries the peak level of the share of working age 
population comes close to 70%. Furthermore, it 
shows that countries differ markedly regarding 
when peak level shares are highest and for how 
long such high levels prevail. For most countries 
shares are still rising up to about 2035. Palestine, 
Jordan, and Syria reach peak-level shares beyond 
2050 however. Of the 11 countries, Palestine 
currently has the lowest working-age population 
share (54.7%) and the highest growth potential in 
terms of demographic dividend. Tunisia (69.6% in 
2010) and Lebanon (70.1% in 2015) however, have 
practically already reached a peak-level 
demographic dividend but levels remain high, at 
least up to 2035, after which working age shares 
will rapidly decrease and shares of elderly people 
(Table 6) increase. The figure shows that, 
compared to Libya and Algeria, Turkey benefits 
relatively longer from high levels of working-age 
shares. The large differences between scenario 
results for Israel reflect the large effect that 
different international migration assumptions have 
on the size and composition of the population. For 
instance, the stress scenario (S4) assumes that out-
migration rises to all-time high figures similar to 
the all-time high figures of immigration in the years 
following the establishment of Israel in 1948.  
Although the demographic dividend may be a 
necessary condition for economic growth it 
certainly is not a sufficient condition. To take full 
advantage of a situation whereby around 70% of 
SEMC populations are of working age, SEMC 
governments and market sector enterprises must set 
the stage for continuous economic growth to absorb 
growing numbers of people entering the labour 
market. Thus, employment rates 1  should remain 
stable or, preferably, increase, to ensure that 
increased numbers of people looking for work can 
find it.  
Table 5 shows trends in employment rates in 
SEMCs and main EU countries (ILO, 2012). 
Employment rates of men in SEMCs are high and 
frequently higher than in EU countries. To a high 
degree this reflects the necessity of men to work 
and care for the family because women in most of 
these Islamic countries have cultural restrictions 
that prevent them from participating in the labour 
market. This is illustrated by the large differences 
between male and female employment rates in 
SEMCs, as compared to the differences in EU 
countries.  
The table also shows that in the past decade the 
employment rates of men in most SEMCs have 
remained fairly stable or slightly increased, except 
for Palestine, Syria and Turkey where rates have 
declined. Apart from Syria, female employment 
rates have remained either stable at low levels or 
increased. Only in the case of Syria did rates for 
women clearly decline even further. The low 
                                                     
1 The employment rate or employment-to-population ratio 
is defined as the proportion of a country’s working age 
population (15-64yrs) gainfully employed. It is one of four 
indicators to measure progress in Millennium Development 
Goal 1b “achieving full and productive employment and 
decent work for all, including women and young people”. 
The limitation of the indicator is that it does not measure 
job quality, working conditions, or adequacy of income 
derived from being employed (ILO, 2012).  
POPULATION SCENARIOS AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS FOR SOUTH MEDITERRANEAN COUNTRIES, 2010-2050 | 11 
 
participation rates of both men and women in 
Palestine are likely to reflect the problematic 
political and economic conditions there. To date, 
Palestinians depend greatly on employment 
opportunities in Israel and Jordan. All scenarios 
foresee rapid Palestinian population growth and 
rising numbers in the working ages (Figures 3 and 
4); numbers that are unlikely to be absorbed in 
local labour markets should the BAU or stress 
scenarios (S1 and S4) materialise.  
To cope with declining shares of working age 
populations, for most SEMCs beyond 2035 a way 
out is to increase female labour force participation. 
To date, women in SEMCs are a relatively 
untapped source of economic growth, so investing 
in their educational attainment, occupational skills 
and labour force participation is not only wise from 
an ethical point of view but also from an economic 
point of view, notably in countries where working 
age shares are decreasing, such as in Tunisia, 
Lebanon, and Turkey.  
Table 5. Trends in employment rates in SEMCs and selected EU countries  
 
Source: ILO, 2012. 
The elderly 
Last but not least, scenario results indicate that the 
number of persons in the age group 65+ is expected 
to grow considerably in various countries. The first 
signs of ageing populations are clearly illustrated 
by the age pyramids of Algeria, Lebanon, Tunisia 
and Turkey. Another way of looking at this aspect 
of ageing is shown in Table 6 by means of old-age 
dependency ratios (ODR). ODRs are expressed as 
percentages and relate the number of persons aged 
65 and older to the number of persons in the 
working ages 15-64 years. Such ratios describe the 
population base for financing the cost of health care 
for the elderly, which increase as people grow older. 
A substantial part of the working age population 
needs to be gainfully employed to provide the 
financial basis for this health care. However, this 
group is not simply a cost factor to the economy. 
Accumulated wealth and savings are likely to be 
higher at higher ages. If part of this is invested in 
the economy, growth in the share of the elderly in 
the population can be interpreted as an increase of a 
second type of demographic dividend (Mason & 
Lee, 2007; Lee & Mason, 2006; Mason, 2005). 
The figures in Table 6 show even more clearly that 
the 2010 age distributions of all SEMCs in 2010 are 
those of relatively young populations compared to 
populations of EU countries. On average, in the EU, 
there are about four persons in the working age 
population vs. one person aged 65 or older. In the 
Palestine population (OPT) there are about 20 
persons in the working age range for one person 
aged 65 or older. In neighbouring Israel the 
situation is quite different and resembles the 
situation in the EU. In Israel, there are only about 
six persons of working age that need to support one 
person of age 65 or older. However, the GDP per 
capita of Israel is much higher than that of Palestine. 
Old-age dependency ratios are on the increase in 
SEMCs, but lag far behind EU values.  
M F F-M M F F-M M F F-M
Algeria 54 9 -45 62 13 -50 64 15 -49
Egypt 69 18 -51 71 18 -53 70 22 -48
Israel 56 48 -8 56 50 -6 58 54 -4
Jordan 60 12 -48 60 11 -49 59 15 -44
Lebanon 65 19 -46 65 21 -44 65 22 -43
Libya 67 28 -39 70 30 -40 72 30 -42
Morocco 68 26 -42 69 27 -42 68 26 -42
Palestine (O.P.T.) 57 12 -45 49 15 -34 49 16 -33
Syria 75 18 -57 71 14 -57 67 12 -55
Tunesia 61 20 -41 59 22 -37 60 23 -37
Turkey 69 25 -44 64 22 -42 63 26 -38
Sweden 64 57 -7 63 57 -6 63 57 -5
U.K. 66 51 -15 66 52 -13 63 53 -10
France 57 46 -12 58 49 -9 57 49 -7
Germany 63 45 -18 59 46 -13 62 50 -12
Italy 56 31 -25 57 36 -22 55 36 -19
Spain 60 33 -27 63 41 -22 54 43 -11
2005 20102000
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Table 6. Old-age dependency ratios of SEMCs and EU27 (rounded percentages) 
 
Source: Groenewold et al., 2012. 
 
The figures also reflect the fact that the 
demographic transition from high fertility and 
mortality rates to low rates started relatively late 
(1980s) compared to countries in Europe and that 
the speed of the decline is different. By 2050 about 
half the number of SEMCs (Egypt, Jordan, OPT, 
Morocco, Syria, Turkey) will still not even come 
close to the average 2010 old-age dependency ratio 
of EU27 countries. Only few SEMCs (Lebanon, 
Israel) will have dependency ratios by 2050 
resembling the EU27-average of 2030. 
Discussion and policy implications 
The MEDPRO project developed four political-
economic development scenarios for SEMCs and 
we hypothesised how present values of 
demographic behaviour indicators might change 
should they be shaped in a different context. Using 
conventional population projection methodologies, 
we derived four scenario estimates for each 
country’s population in terms of future population 
size and age-sex structures for the period 2010-
2050. We focused on analysing future trends in i) 
population growth at regional and country levels, ii) 
growth of working age populations and potential 
demographic dividend, and iii) ageing aspects in 
view of future cost and benefits of this group. 
Results show that in spite of declines in fertility 
rates in SEMCs, populations are still growing fast 
and far more so than populations in EU countries. 
During the 2010-2050 period SEMCs’ populations 
are expected to grow considerably, from about 280 
million to a figure of between 395 and 426 million, 
while EU27 populations will only grow from about 
500 to 525 million people. We found that the 
margins between lowest and highest scenario 
estimates are not large for predictions of short-term 
population growth. For instance, the largest 
difference in 2020 is between the BAU scenario 
estimate (323.3 million) and the stress scenario 
estimate (319.5 million), which is 3.8 million, or 
about 1% only. This small difference is not 
surprising because much of the population growth 
in these countries is already embedded in the 
current size and shape of these countries’ age-sex 
pyramids; a phenomenon called ‘population 
momentum’. In the long term though, population 
estimates become more sensitive to differences in 
scenario assumptions. However, such differences 
are attenuated because effects of specific fertility 
and mortality scenarios cancel out to some extent. 
For instance, in the alliance scenario (S3) the 
population-increasing effect of increasing life 
expectancy is partially offset by the population-
reducing effect of declining fertility. Another issue 
is that the rather widely different scenario 
assumptions about net numbers of international 
migrants turned out to have little overall impact on 
expected population growth for some countries 
because net numbers turned out to be small relative 
to total population size, as in the case of Turkey 
and Egypt. 
We then examined scenario estimates for working 
age populations. The growth of the working age 
population is considered as a demographic dividend 
because, other things being equal, growing 
numbers of potential workers means increased 
economic production and earnings. Whether and to 
what extent SEMC economies take advantage of 
the demographic dividend depends on the political 
and economic climate in the country, region and 
world, the presence of creative and effective 
2010
S1 S2 S3 S4 S1 S2 S3 S4
Algeria 7 11 12 12 11 23 27 28 23
Egypt 8 11 12 12 11 16 19 20 15
Israel 17 21 19 20 23 26 20 24 34
Jordan 7 6 7 7 6 14 15 17 14
Lebanon 11 15 15 16 16 26 24 29 37
Libya 7 10 11 11 10 24 27 29 28
Morocco 8 13 14 14 13 21 25 27 20
O.P.T. 5 6 6 6 5 9 10 11 8
Syria 7 10 10 10 9 15 16 17 14
Tunisia 10 16 16 17 15 28 31 33 28
Turkey 9 14 15 16 14 25 29 30 22
EU27 26
2030 2050
38 50
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policy-makers and planners, and environmental and 
ecological conditions permitting sustainable 
economic growth. 
We found that in the coming decades most SEMCs 
will either experience increases in numbers and 
relative size of working age populations, or they 
will experience stabilisation of already high 
numbers and shares. Thus, the window of 
opportunity for a demographic dividend is opening 
or is already open to SEMCs, but will start closing 
around 2035. Furthermore, the perks of this 
demographic dividend may equally turn into a 
demographic penalty if employment opportunities 
do not adequately increase too. Should employment 
rates remain the same or even decline, such as in 
the case of Syria and Palestine, then the numbers of 
unemployed people will increase, placing a burden 
on society, causing social unrest and political 
instability. Labour migration, frequently a safety 
valve in the past for excess (unemployed) 
population, will become more difficult because 
receiving countries, such as in the EU, despite 
expected labour force shortages, will increasingly 
prevent immigrants from entering if they do not 
have the vocational skills to properly integrate into 
the receiving countries’ labour market and socio-
cultural environment.  
From an economic and demographic point of view 
it would have been better if the Arab Spring had 
started 10-15 years ago, leaving more time to 
reform SEMCs’ societies and take maximum  
advantage of available demographic dividend 
potential (i.e. a growing share of working age 
population shares vs. a declining share of the 
economically dependent population (youth, elderly). 
To take advantage of the still-available 
demographic dividend potential implies that 
SEMCs’ governments develop and implement 
effective policy measures contributing to political 
stability, economic-, employment- and income 
growth, including the establishment of social and 
financial safety nets. Such measures include the 
improved availability of and access to education 
and vocational skills (in particular for young 
women); adaptation of human resource 
development to meet labour market requirements 
(i.e. upgrading curricula in schools and colleges, 
and improving educators to ensure that acquired 
knowledge and skills prepare students for 
employment). Also needed is the improvement of 
infrastructure; the reduction of government 
regulations that hamper economic growth; 
protection against labour and ecosystem 
exploitation, and the promotion of ethnic and 
religious tolerance.  
These policy options are consistent with the 
findings of other MEDPRO studies (Ayadi, El 
Mahdi and Carrera, 2013). This research concludes, 
among other things, that in past decades SEMCs 
have experienced considerable progress in human 
capital development, such as higher school 
enrolment, reduction of gender gaps in education, 
and higher government spending on education. 
However, differences with EU countries are still 
considerable, in particular in the domain of female 
labour force participation. In most SEMCs there are 
socio-cultural barriers that prevent the mobility of 
women and their participation in and contribution 
to the economy and policies are needed to 
overcome such barriers. Furthermore, increased 
educational attainment in most SEMCs has not led 
to higher participation rates in the job market. This 
is partly attributed to the quality of education 
received. Education and skills acquired in schools 
generally do not match the requirements in the job 
market. This is an area requiring the urgent 
attention of policy-makers, in both SEMCs and the 
EU. In SEMCs, working age populations are high 
and in several countries still rising, which leads to 
higher numbers of unemployed persons who have 
diplomas and skills that do not match the demands 
of employers. In various EU countries, in decades 
to come, the demand for skilled labour is expected 
to increase as working age populations shrink. EU 
investment in improving education quality in 
SEMCs would be beneficial to both regions, if 
labour force surpluses and shortages in both regions 
could be matched and overcome.  
National and EU policy-makers could convene and 
develop strategies and programmes to better 
prepare children and young adults, in particular 
women, for the human skills and quality demands 
of labour markets in SEMCs and EU countries. The 
future need for skilled labour in EU countries 
requires EU and SEMC policy-makers to 
modernise EU migration policies to encompass 
new admission rules and regulations, and labour 
migration programmes that better control the flow 
of (skilled) labour migration from SEMCs to the 
EU and back. Obviously, such programmes should 
prepare prospective migrants for life in EU 
countries in terms of socio-cultural adaptation. 
These issues should be agreed upon between EU 
and its neighbouring countries, for instance in the 
format of a kind of ‘Roadmap to Mobility’ 
programme. 
An emerging issue is that ageing will also become a 
phenomenon to reckon with in some countries (e.g. 
Israel, Tunisia, Lebanon, and Turkey) after about 
2035. This means that the health system has to be 
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transformed to be able to cope with disease pattern 
changes, entailing a shift in focus from mainly 
dealing with infectious and preventable diseases of 
children and mothers to typical old-age lifestyle 
diseases (obesity, diabetes) and degenerative 
diseases (cancers). The future growth in the 
numbers of elderly people will result in growing 
health costs during a period when numbers of 
workers in the economy are declining. This 
requires governments to stimulate healthy lifestyles 
in the population in all age groups, including youth. 
A healthy life at an older age requires living a 
healthy life at a young age. The latter ensures that 
the future elderly will age as healthily as possible, 
requiring a minimum of health and old-age support. 
Should the S2 or S3 scenarios unfold an increasing 
share of the future elderly may have accumulated 
sufficient wealth and savings during their lifetimes 
to permit them to contribute, at an older age, to the 
rising healthcare costs in their ageing population. 
Wealth and savings among the elderly of the future 
reduce dependency and stimulate the economy as 
savings may be either reinvested or consumed by 
the elderly. This is another type of potential 
demographic dividend, whereby people are 
motivated and in a position during their working 
lives to create financial reserves for their old-age 
support. 
If the BAU or stress scenarios unfold the expected 
economic conditions will be unfavourable in 
SEMCs. This may increase emigration pressure 
among young adults, which may lead to a brain 
drain of the relatively small group of well-educated 
young adults in SEMCs to EU countries. There, 
highly-skilled labour and people with ‘desirable 
skills’ are becoming scarce as most EU countries, 
in contrast to SEMCs, face shrinking populations in 
the working ages. Should the integration or alliance 
scenarios unfold, the future for young adults will be 
much brighter and may even lead well-educated, 
pioneering children of SEMC country emigrants, 
born in the countries of destination, to return to the 
homeland of their parents to explore possibilities of 
a future there. This kind of migration has already 
been observed among enterprising and well-
educated children of Turkish emigrants born in 
Germany who explore their options in the currently 
booming Turkish economy.  
The population and development scenarios were 
developed at a time when various countries in the 
region were going through a major transition period 
of fighting for political freedom, democratisation 
and for different government structures. To date, 
the outcome is yet uncertain. We made the 
assumption that by 2015 the situation would have 
returned, more or less, to stability in the sense that 
new political contexts would not lead to major 
changes in demographic behaviour. But is this 
assumption reasonable if the Arab Spring protests 
and political mayhem spreads across the entire 
region, leading to the establishment of anti-western, 
conservative Islamic governments in all SEMCs? 
More specifically, can the results of these 
population scenarios encompass a population 
growth trajectory of societies led by such 
governments?  
We think the answer is affirmative, and most 
certainly in the intermediate term, say, up to 2030, 
for the following reasons.  
Firstly, the ‘population momentum’ embedded in 
the current age-sex pyramids of SEMCs means that 
population growth during the 2010-2030 period is 
rather insensitive to sudden changes in fertility and 
mortality rates. Past high fertility rates created large 
birth cohorts that will reach reproductive age about 
15-20 years later. Although having fewer births per 
woman than older generations, the sheer size of 
these birth cohorts means that the absolute number 
of births is high. Therefore, reinforced by declining 
mortality rates, these will continue to grow for 
years to come, despite the decline in fertility rates 
in the past two decades. With respect to the 
international migration component of population 
growth, even if all persons who even slightly 
oppose lifestyles according to conservative Islamic 
law would all intend to emigrate or flee from 
SEMCs, the actual numbers departing would be 
limited by immigration and asylum restrictions in 
receiving countries. After 2030, the effects of 
changes in fertility and mortality rates would 
become apparent but population growth effects 
would still be attenuated if the new political context 
leads to both higher fertility and mortality rates, 
because the effects would to a certain extent cancel 
each other out.  
Secondly, the establishment of anti-western, 
conservative Islamic governments may raise fears 
about a population explosion in these countries. 
However, there is little evidence that the presence 
of a government driven by conservative Islamic 
values, Shiite or Sunni, necessarily leads to higher 
fertility and higher population growth rates. The 
cases of Iran and Saudi Arabia are illustrative.  
With about 77 million people, in terms of size, Iran 
is between the two largest SEMCs, Egypt and 
Turkey. Since 1979, after the ousting of the 
western-oriented Shah of Persia, Iran has an anti-
western and conservative Shiite Islamic 
government, initially under the leadership of 
Ayatollah Khomeini. Before 1979, Iran was open to 
western modernisation and lifestyle influences but 
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the number of children (TFR) per woman between 
1960 and 1979 hovered between 6.8 and 6.0 
children per woman. However, after the 
establishment of the Islamic government in 1979, 
fertility rates dropped rapidly to about 1.9 in 2010, 
below replacement level fertility (i.e. 2.1 children). 
Furthermore, the trend in declining mortality rates 
was only interrupted for about seven years, shortly 
before and after the establishment of the Islamic 
government. While life expectancy increased from 
45 years in 1960 to about 55 in 1977, it then 
dropped to 50 years by 1984. However, after the 
firm establishment of the Islamic government the 
past trend in life expectancy improvement picked 
up again, leading to a life expectancy of 72 years in 
2010 (UN, 2012). Saudi Arabia, with its population 
of 26 million people – the size of Morocco and 
Syria, is the core area of Sunni Muslim tradition. 
There, too, the average number of children per 
woman fell in recent decades, from more than 7 
children per woman before 1978 to about 2.8 
children in 2010, while life expectancy increased 
from about 45 years in 1960 to about 74 years in 
2010 (UN, 2012). Islamic countries are also going 
through a period of demographic transition, which 
is interrupted temporarily by changes in the socio-
political character of their governments.  
Thirdly, the influence that governments and other 
macro-level factors have on the micro-level 
demographic behaviour of individuals should not 
be overrated. There are many examples where 
governments have failed to influence the behaviour 
of individuals, notably if the proposed behaviour is 
not in accordance with individuals’ aspirations, 
couples or social groups. The strict norms and 
values promoted by religious leaders and their 
followers in government may in practice only be 
implemented by a minority of the population. For 
example, despite the pro-natalist and anti-abortion 
stance of the Vatican, Catholic Italians have 
reduced their number of births rapidly in recent 
decades to a level below replacement. Furthermore, 
they legalised abortion back in 1978, and abortion 
rates are still fairly high. Other types of examples 
can be found in the sub-Saharan region where 
governments tried, with the financial support and 
advice of international organisations, but mostly in 
vain, to control fertility or safe-sex behaviour by 
conveying messages to the public. This is because 
awareness-raising among the public through the 
media (and church or mosque) is a necessary but 
most certainly not sufficient measure. Other, more 
pervasive factors at the community, household and 
individual level mean that people behave 
differently and do not necessarily follow the will of 
governments or the clergy. Factors such as 
educational attainment, wealth status and 
aspirations, gender norms, values and roles, 
perceived costs and benefits of rearing children 
may lead to attitudes and behaviour of individuals 
that are resilient to change in a specific direction. 
Evidence suggests that the impact of religious 
leaders on reproductive (and other) decisions of 
couples is limited and often overrated, regardless of 
the prevailing faith in countries or regions.  
The above considerations convince us that future 
population trajectories of SEMCs, irrespective of 
the presence of governments with strong or weak 
religious prescriptions, will develop somewhere 
between the high-low margins of predicted 
population size as indicated by the population 
projection results of the alliance (S3) and stress (S4) 
scenarios, respectively (see Table 5).  
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Annex 1. Operationalisation of migration, fertility, mortality assumptions 
 
Source: Groenewold et al., 2012. 
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Annex 2. Current (2010) and estimated (2050) population pyramids of 11 SEMCs, implied by 
four different development scenarios 
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Source: Groenewold et al., 2012. 
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Annex 3. Expected demographic dividend: working-age population (15-64) as a % of the total 
population, by development scenario (S1-S4) 
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Source: Groenewold et al., 2012. 
MEDPR
througho
the Cent
challeng
this end
integrati
disciplin
geopoliti
resource
analyses
migratio
future po
 
Title 
Descrip
Medite
countr
Coordi
Consor
Budget
Duratio
EC Scie
Websit
Contac
 
O – Medite
ut the Medi
re for Europ
es facing the
, MEDPRO
on and coop
ary approac
cs and gove
s; energy an
; financial 
n. By carryi
licy decisio
tion  
rranean 
ies covered 
nator 
tium  
 and Fundin
n  
ntific Office
e  
t e­mail  
rranean Pro
terranean fu
ean Policy 
 countries in
  will unde
eration with
h is taken 
rnance; dem
d climate ch
services and
ng out this 
ns at both do
MEDPR
MEDPR
Mediter
compre
for futur
 
Algeria, 
and Tur
Dr. Rym
Centre f
Econom
Internat
Italy; Fo
FEMISE
Istituto 
Comput
IEMed, 
Istituto 
Compét
Agronom
Institute
NIDI, Ne
Europea
g   Total bu
1 April 2
r   Dr. Dom
www.m
medpro
 
Abo
spects – is
nded under 
Studies bas
 the Southe
rtake a pro
 the EU up
to the rese
ography, he
ange mitiga
 capital ma
work, MED
mestic and E
O – Prospect
O explores th
ranean regio
hensive fores
e policy dec
Egypt, Israel
key  
 Ayadi, Centr
or European
ic Research, 
ional Affairs
rum Euro‐M
, France; Fac
Affari Intern
er Systems, I
Spain; Institu
di Studi per l
itivité et des 
ic Institute 
, MAS, Pales
therlands;  U
n Economic 
dget: €3,088
010 – 31Ma
enico Rosset
edpro‐foresi
@ceps.eu 
 
ut MED
 a consorti
the EU’s 7th
ed in Bruss
rn Mediterra
spective an
 to 2030 an
arch, which
alth and age
tion; econom
rkets; huma
PRO aims to
U levels. 
ive Analysis f
e challenges
n in the com
ight analysis
isions at both
, Jordan, Leb
e for Europe
 Policy Studie
CASE, Poland
, CCEIA, Cypr
éditerranéen
ulty of  Econ
azionali, IAI, 
CCS/NTUA, 
t Marocain d
’Integrazione
Etudes Quan
of Bari, MAIB
tine; Netherl
niversidad P
Research, ZE
,573    EC‐DG
rch 2013 (36
ti Di Valdalb
ght.eu  
PRO 
um of 17 h
 Framework
els. At its c
nean region
alysis, buil
d on variou
 is organis
ing; manage
ic integratio
n capital, s
 deliver a s
or the Medit
 facing the co
ing decades. 
 to provide a
 domestic an
anon, Libya, 
an Policy Stu
s, CEPS, Belg
; Cyprus Cen
us; Fondazio
 des Instituts
omics and Po
Italy; Institu
Greece; Instit
es Relations
 dei Sistemi,
titatives, ITC
, Italy; Pales
ands Interdis
olitecnica d
W, Germany
 RESEARCH
 months) 
ero, DG RESE
 
ighly reput
 Programme
ore, MEDPR
 in the comi
ding on sc
s impact as
ed into sev
ment of env
n, trade, inv
ocial protec
ound scient
erranean Reg
untries in th
The project w
 sound scien
d EU levels. 
Morocco, Pal
dies (CEPS),
ium; Center
ter for Euro
ne Eni Enric
 de Sciences
litical Scienc
te of Commu
ut Europeu d
 Internationa
 ISIS, Italy; In
EQ, Tunisia;
tine Econom
ciplinary De
e Madrid, UP
  
 contribution
ARCH  
  
ed institutio
 and coordi
O explores
ng decades. 
enarios for 
sessments. 
en fields o
ironment an
estment and
tion, inequa
ific underpin
ion  
e South 
ill undertak
tific underpi
 
estine, Syria,
 rym.ayadi@
 for Social an
pean and 
o Mattei, FEE
 Economique
es, FEPS, Egy
nication and 
e la Mediter
les, IMRI, M
stitut Tunis
 Mediterrane
ic Policy Res
mographic In
M, Spain; Cen
: €2,647,330
ns from 
nated by 
 the key 
Towards 
regional 
A multi-
f study: 
d natural 
 sectoral 
lity and 
ning for 
e a 
nning 
 Tunisia 
ceps.eu
d 
M, 
s, 
pt; 
rania, 
orocco; 
ien de la 
an 
earch 
stitute, 
tre for 
  
